In this paper, we propose a new approach to security of access in hostile environments based on the history and relationships among the nodes and on digital operation certificates.
INTRODUCTION
An ad hoc wireless network is built on cooperation between two or more nodes with wireless links and networking capability. The major applications of such networks today are tactical military and other security-sensitive operations. For example, military and police units (e.g. soldiers, tanks, police cars) equipped with wireless communication devices can form ad hoc networks when they roam in insecure environments (1) . Ad hoc networks can also be used for emergency, law enforcement and rescue missions. Since such networks have relatively low cost and can be deployed rapidly, they constitute a viable option for commercial uses such as sensor networks and emergency situations, and there is a trend to adopt them for commercial uses due to their unique properties. The most critical challenge in the design of these networks is their security in hostile environments (2) .
The nodes in an ad hoc network are independent units which roam in an insecure environment. They rely not on a central infrastructure but on neighbouring nodes to route each packet to the destination node. Ad hoc networks can work properly only if the participating nodes cooperate with each other in routing and forwarding (3) . Nodes lack physical protection and are always under threat of being captured and compromised. They carry user and device history, as each node can obtain data on all events involving a specific user and a specific device; therefore it has to be able to document the user and the device at the registration stage (4). Attacks on ad hoc networks can come from any direction and can target any node. Thus, ensuring a secure environment for an ad hoc network is as important as for wired networks, which have several lines of defence such as firewalls and gateways (5) . Security depends on access to the history of each unit, which is used to calculate the cooperative values of each node in the environment. The calculated cooperative values are then used by the relationship estimator to determine the status of the nodes. Every node should be capable of making its own security decisions based on cooperation with other peer nodes. Our contributions are presented a new approach to control access to a secure ad hoc environment based on the history and operation certificate of its nodes.
It also proposes an access activity diagram which explains the steps taken by a node while The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 discusses the requirements for any security solution, while Section 3 explains the secure environment. Section 4 describes the creation of public/ private keys and digital certificates. A section 5 set out the components of our architecture and Section 6 concludes the paper.
II.
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
The following are the security requirements to be met by a secure environment.
Authentication: Ensures the identity of the node with which the communication is carried out. This avoids impersonation.
Availability: Ensures that the eligible nodes are able to obtain the required services despite denial-of-service attacks.
Non-repudiation: Ensures that a node cannot deny a particular action performed by it at a later stage. This could help in the detection of compromised nodes.
Detection of malicious nodes: Ensures that nodes are capable of detecting the presence of malicious nodes in the environment, thus avoiding the participation of such nodes in the routing process.
Stability: Ensures that a node is able to revert to its normal operating state within a finite time after any attack.
III. SECURE ENVIRONMENTS
In a secure environment, some of the ad hoc nodes are involved in other infrastructure-based wireless networks such as WLANs and cellular systems; therefore, each of the ad hoc nodes will belong to an operation service provider (OSP), as shown in Figure 1 . Other non-managed ad hoc network nodes, which are not involved in any other wireless networks, will be managed by the OSP, in order for those undefined nodes or networks to be able to access our secure environment (SE). The following sections show how our SE will consist of a number of ad hoc networks interconnecting with each other.
A. Node Classification
Nodes in the SE will be classified thus:
User Nodes are normal ground nodes; typically soldiers equipped with devices of limited communication and computation ability whose duty it is to collect data and transfer it to a network backbone node (NBBN).
Network Backbone Nodes are usually units or master nodes located within the same network, for example in towers or tanks. NBBNs can establish direct wireless links to communicate amongst themselves.
Operation Service Providers are usually units in the environment. This type of node will have many management, registration and control functions, such as duty signing and creating new certificates for different nodes in the secure environment. Certificate-documented nodes are those which possess a certificate issued by the OSP. They will have come into contact with a secure environment earlier and the certificate will verify that they are secure. Information on these nodes is stored in the documented DB of the OSP and they do not have any history in the documented DB.
Undocumented nodes are those in the secure environment which do not fall into either of the above two categories. This category may also contain nodes which could have been certificate-documented by an OSP, but remain undocumented because there has been no need to verify their certificates.
IV.
DIGITAL OPERATION CERTIFICATE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
This section describes the certificate management system of a secure environment. It shows how public/private keys and digital operation certificates are created. It also illustrates the process of certificate revocation.
A. Creation of Public/ Private Keys and Digital Certificates
The public keys and the corresponding private keys of secure environment nodes are created by the OSP, which also issues the public-key certificates of SE nodes. Since a key is unique, (Kpublic) is unique and thus H(Kpublic), the fingerprint of Kpublic, would also be unique. It is considered the identifier in an SE. The operation certificate will be used as permission to access this environment. Each node in the secure environment will hold its digital operation certificate in its Node Database (NDB). The main structure of digital operation certificates is shown in Figure. ... It contains the Mac address of the node, its public key, the name of the operation service provider issuing this certificate, the certificate issue and expiry dates and the public key of the OSP. Finally, the contents of the certificate will be attached to the digital signature of the OSP.
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B. Digital Operation Certificate Distribution
Certificate distribution is a very important and low-cost mechanism that allows SE nodes to send the certificates they hold. Each node periodically starts receiving its physical neighbour (in one hop), its digital operation certificate and the corresponding OSP's public key stored in its NDB. Each node receives these certificates, compares them with its NDB and adds whatever new certificates it does not hold, as well as the public keys of its issuer; or it adds the renewal of an expired, extant certificate. The certificate distribution process is repeated at regular time intervals (RTIs). All nodes will have almost all digital operation certificates based on the mobility of the nodes and the RTI.
C. Revocation of Digital Operation Certificates
The digital certificate management system provides certificate revocation as one of the basic services. There are two types of certificate revocation in our algorithm. Explicit revocation occurs when any node has a certificate and the OSP revokes it. The OSP sends the corresponding revocation to the other nodes belonging to the SE. If it cannot send the corresponding revocation for any reason, the renewal of the certificate can be denied, resulting in an implicit revocation.
In general, the OSP, when issuing the certificate, determines its issuing and validity times. All certificates are revoked after their expiration time. Therefore, the OSP should be updated about the certificates of SE nodes before the expiration time.
In both types of revocation, when the OSP provides the SE nodes with any information about any certificate, it should be distributed through the exchange process. In this way the nodes in the secure environment will be provided with this new information. Consequently, the OSP is responsible for the certificate revocation process and for transferring these revocations to all SE nodes. All SE nodes are informed when any of them carries out an explicit revocation and their NDBs are subsequently modified. This revocation will be distributed to the other nodes in the secure environment, both by certificate distribution and the process by which NDBs are merged.
The OSP is responsible for updating those certificates that have been implicitly revoked at regular intervals. Each SE node that has a new certificate will update its NDB, then transfer the new certificate to its neighbours through the certificate distribution process. If any node does not receive the new certificate through the distribution and merging processes, and needs to validate the key, a new certificate will be requested from the OSP itself.
V.
COMPONENTS OF OUR ARCHITECTURE
The components of our architecture are as follows:
User Nodes, as set out in 3.1 above, are typically soldiers or persons equipped with devices of limited communication and computation ability, whose duty is to deal with nodes, collect data and transfer them to NBBNs.
Network Backbone Nodes are usually units or master nodes located within the same network, for example towers or tanks. NBBNs can establish direct wireless links for communication among themselves. There are three divisions which carry out many functions (management, observation, control and so on) for the network. Their responsibility is to collect data, to observe nodes entering the network and to record the histories and certificates of all other nodes.
Operation Service Providers are usually units in the environment whose six divisions carry out many functions (management, registration, control and so on) for that environment. Their responsibility is to register new nodes, collect and analyse data, update the history of nodes and observe nodes entering the environment. The OSP has six units, which are the Registration Unit (RU), the Operation Certificate Unit (OCU), the Data Packet Collection Unit, the Analyser Unit (AU), the History Model Unit and the Database Unit.
The responsibility of the Registration Unit is to register a new node and apply the policy of the unit. Registration is an important stage before issuing a digital operation certificate for a node, as it verifies the identity of the user. This is the function of the RU. The user provides the RU with essential information: the user's name, the Mac address of the device and the fingerprint of the user.
The Operation Certificate Unit is the main service provided by the OSP. When the OCU receives a certification request from the RU, the OSP issues a digital operation certificate and signs it with its private key. The structure of the certificate should be defined by being standardised to ITU-T recommendation X.509, for example. All the information needed to complete the certificate will be provided by the RU.
The Data Packet Collection Unit collects the data packets in a secure environment and saves them in the main buffer. The data collector enables the packet analyser to use data collection containers to analyse all available data that the system has collected from the different nodes. At the same time it enables the packet analyser to process the transferred information, which can be used to obtain and save data that is gathered from several sources.
The Database Unit stores information on each node in a secure environment, including information regarding the history model of each node. It also keeps information like H(Kpublic), Kpublic, the fingerprints of each node and the Mac address of each device. Finally, it holds information regarding digital operation certificates and their revocation, to help in restricting future access with the same certificate.
The History Model Unit is used to calculate the cooperation values of each node in the environment. Our secure environment access system uses the history of nodes to build several lines of protection, equivalent to firewalls and gateways in wired networks. This unit receives data on the classification of nodes from the analyser base to analyse the packets. There are three kinds of node, as follows. 
1) Positive Node (POSN
The Analyzer Unit checks each packet or message in the secure environment that the main buffer has collected. It then classifies all packets according to their contents. The analyser deals with all definition of packets and messages. It has the ability to define and classify unknown packets and add to the classification. The analyser will classify the nodes in the secure environment into three categories, POSN, NATN and NEGN, according to the following table. A. Activity diagram Activity diagram which explains the steps taken by a node while handling requests to access a secure environment. 
CONCLUSION
This paper proposes to control access to a secure ad hoc environment based on the history of its nodes. It also proposes an access activity diagram which explains the steps taken by a node while handling requests to access a secure environment. The solution is a combination of the history of the nodes and operation certificates. Each node in a secure environment is uniquely identified by its public key. The solution protects against various vulnerability issues affecting wireless links such as active and passive attacks. It is scalable and does not depend on other devices. The dynamic nature of networks and their membership does not affect the solution, since each node makes access decisions on its own and the use of cooperative algorithms is avoided.
